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Remedying the Armed Career Criminal Act’s Ailing 
Residual Provision 
Hayley A. Montgomery† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jeriehmie Franetich is a dangerous man.  By the age of twenty-four, 
he had been convicted of three felonies: drive-by shooting, third-degree 
assault, and riot.1  On May 24, 2007,2 Mr. Franetich stood before the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Washington and pleaded guilty to 
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1).3  Because Mr. Franetich had three prior felony convictions, 
he faced a fifteen-year mandatory minimum prison sentence under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA” or “the Act”). 
At sentencing, the question before the court was whether Mr. Fra-
netich’s drive-by shooting conviction qualified as a “violent felony” un-
der the ACCA.  Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United 
States,4 the answer would have been simple: it qualified.  But after Be-
gay, which redefined the way courts decide whether certain crimes quali-
fy as violent felonies under the ACCA, the answer is much less clear. 
This Comment explores the U.S. Supreme Court’s attempt to create 
a judicial standard for defining the term “violent felony” that embodies 
the purpose of the ACCA and its ultimate failure to do so.  Part II 
presents a brief background on the ACCA.  Part III discusses United 
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 1. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Armed Career Criminal Designation at 4, 
United States v. Jeriehmie Joel Franetich, No. CR-06-123-EFS (E.D. Wash. May 29, 2008). 
 2. Id. at 2.  Although the court’s order states that Mr. Franetich pleaded guilty on May 24, 
2008, it appears that this date is wrong.  In fact, Mr. Franetich pleaded guilty on May 24, 2007. 
 3. Id. 
 4. 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008). 
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States v. James,5 Begay, and United States v. Chambers6—three recent 
Supreme Court decisions that suggest the Court’s analyses are flawed.  
Part IV examines opportunities for the Court and Congress to remedy the 
situation, including a critique of each proposal. 
II.  THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT’S RESIDUAL CLAUSE: A 
SUMMARY 
A.  History and Purpose 
Congress enacted the ACCA in 1984, seeking to protect society 
from violent habitual criminals by incarcerating them.7  When drafting 
the legislation, Congress relied on studies showing that a large percen-
tage of violent crimes were being committed by a very small percentage 
of repeat offenders.8  That is, recidivism rates were high among violent 
criminals;9 so high, in fact, that one study estimated that career criminals 
commit two or three burglaries for every robbery they commit.10 
The purpose of the original legislation was “to curb armed, habitual 
(career) criminals”11 by limiting their access to firearms once they have 
demonstrated a history of serious, violent behavior.12  When Senator Ar-
len Specter introduced his bill on January 26, 1983, he stated: 
Robberies and burglaries are the most damaging crimes to society.  
Robberies and burglaries occur with far greater frequency than other 
violent felonies, affect many more people, and cause the greatest 
losses.  A person is 40 times more likely to be a victim of robbery 
than of rape. 
Robberies involve physical violence or the threat thereof, being de-
liberately directed against innocent individuals. . . . Often—30 per-
cent of robberies—these offenses result in physical injuries; usual-
ly—90 percent for robberies—they result in significant financial 
                                                 
 5. 550 U.S. 192 (2007). 
 6. 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009). 
 7. H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at 2–3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661. 
 8. Id. at 1, 3. 
 9. A study by Professor Marvin E. Wolfgang at the University of Pennsylvania showed that 
“chronic offenders which comprised 6 percent of the study group committed 61 percent of all homi-
cides, 76 percent of all rapes, 73 percent of all robberies, and 65 percent of all aggravated assaults 
perpetrated by members of the group.”  Id. at 2.  Another study focused on two hundred offenders 
serving substantial sentences for serious offenses in federal prisons.  Id.  Based on these offenders’ 
admissions and FBI records, the author estimated that “if they followed their past pattern of conduct 
they would commit 179,000 criminal offenses in a five year period.”  Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1. 
 12. See id.; see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 587–88 (1990). 
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loss; always they inflict psychological injury.  Such crimes force 
people to live not in freedom, but in fear. 
Most robberies and burglaries are committed by career criminals.13 
Thus, the ACCA subjected “any convicted felon found guilty of 
possession of a firearm, who had three previous convictions ‘for robbery 
or burglary’” to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.14  Recog-
nizing that crimes other than robbery and burglary present a similar dan-
ger of physical injury, Congress revisited the Act just five months later, 
this time expanding the range of predicate offenses.15 
Debate ensued as to which crimes should qualify as predicate of-
fenses under the Act.  Congress agreed that only violent felonies—those 
crimes that indicate that a criminal is particularly dangerous when in 
possession of a firearm—should qualify.  While some members of Con-
gress argued that this common goal would be satisfied by a catch-all pro-
vision for all crimes that “present a serious potential risk of physical in-
jury to another,” others argued that a list of dangerous crimes would be 
useful.16 
B.  Language 
In 1986, after vigorous debate, Congress settled on a compromise.17  
Under the ACCA, criminals who violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)18 after being 
convicted of three violent felonies or serious drug offenses must serve a 
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment.19  The 
ACCA presently defines violent felony as “any crime punishable by im-
prisonment for a term exceeding one year” that 
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another; or 
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.20 
The first sub-clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), qualifies violent 
crimes against another person.  This Comment refers to the first sub-
                                                 
 13. H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at 3 (1984). 
 14. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added). 
 15. Id. at 583–85. 
 16. See id. at 586–87. 
 17. Id. at 587. 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prohibits felons from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving 
any firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2009). 
 20. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
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clause as “the physical force provision.”  The focus of this Comment 
however, centers on the interpretation of the second sub-clause, 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is hereinafter referred to as “the residual 
provision.” 
C.  United States Sentencing Guidelines 
 Three years after Congress passed the ACCA, the United States 
Sentencing Commission (USSC or the Sentencing Commission) devel-
oped the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG or Sentencing 
Guidelines).21  Section 2K2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines sets the base 
offense level for felons who have unlawfully possessed firearms under 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Violators of § 922(g) who were previously con-
victed of a “crime of violence”22 are assigned higher base offense levels, 
and as a result, higher sentences.23  USSG § 4B1.2(a) defines crime of 
violence as 
any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year, that—(1) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 
of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, in-
volves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.24 
Obviously, the Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence 
is nearly identical to the ACCA’s definition of a violent felony.25  Not 
surprisingly, courts have interpreted crime of violence and violent felony 
as interchangeable terms; the case law applies to both.  Opinions inter-
preting the ACCA’s violent felony are regularly used to construe the 
Sentencing Guidelines’ crime of violence and vice versa.26  Because the 
violent felony and crime of violence analysis is the same, the Supreme 
Court’s ACCA decisions are wide-reaching. 
III.  SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: JAMES, BEGAY, AND CHAMBERS 
Beginning with Taylor v. United States,27 there are approximately 
ten U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the ACCA.28  However, 
                                                 
 21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009). 
 22. Id. § 2K2.1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). 
 25. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2009), with 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e)(2)(B).  The provisions differ only in that, in the residual provision, the Sentencing Guidelines 
use the phrase “burglary of a dwelling,” while ACCA refers to “burglary.” 
 26. See United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 27. 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
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only three of these decisions are particularly pertinent to this discussion: 
James, Begay, and Chambers.  Together, these cases demonstrate how 
difficult it has been for the Supreme Court to fashion a standard that 
furthers the purpose of the statute—to keep firearms out of the hands of 
violent career criminals.  Furthermore, these cases demonstrate how 
complicated and opaque ACCA jurisprudence has become and why it is 
time for Congress to amend the ACCA. 
A.  James v. United States 
Alphonso James, having already been convicted of a felony, 
pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm.29  James admitted to three prior 
felony convictions: attempted burglary of a dwelling, possession of co-
caine, and trafficking cocaine.30  At issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether attempted burglary qualified as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e).31 
Florida law defines burglary as “entering or remaining in 
a . . . structure . . . with the intent to commit an offense therein.”32  A per-
son commits the offense of criminal attempt in Florida if she attempts to 
commit an offense but fails to execute it.33  The parties agreed that even 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. (interpreting Congress’s listed term burglary under the residual provision); Custis v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) (defining the right to collateral attack on prior convictions under 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)); Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001) (discussing whether ACCA 
enhancement is constitutional when based in part on two prior unconstitutional convictions); She-
pard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (defining what documents the sentencing court might 
examine when determining whether the crime is a violent felony under the categorical approach); 
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (determining whether “attempted burglary” qualifies as 
a violent felony under the residual provision); Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007) (con-
struing the ACCA’s “civil rights restored” exemption under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)); Begay v. Unit-
ed States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (determining whether felony drunk driving is a violent felony under 
the residual provision); United States v. Rodriguez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008) (construing the phrase 
“maximum term of imprisonment . . . prescribed by law” for state drug convictions under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924 (e)(2)(A)(ii)); Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009) (determining whether convic-
tion for failing to report to imprisonment qualifies as a violent felony under the residual provision); 
Johnson v. United States, No. 08-6925 (Oral Argument on Oct. 6, 2009) (determining whether a 
conviction for “unwanted touching,” which had been elevated from simple battery to felony status 
because of a prior battery conviction, qualifies as “physical force” under the physical force provi-
sion). 
 29. James, 550 U.S. at 195. 
 30. Id. at 196.  James’s possession and trafficking offenses were determined to be “serious 
drug offense[s]” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) of the ACCA. 
 31. Id. 
 32. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1993).  Florida defined the crime of burglary at the time of 
James’s conviction as “entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure or a conveyance with the 
intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the 
defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.”  Id. 
 33. According to Florida’s criminal attempt statute, “A person who attempts to commit an 
offense prohibited by law and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of such offense, 
720 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:3 
though it was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 
attempted burglary does not qualify as a violent felony under the physi-
cal force provision because it does not have “as an element the use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another.”34  Furthermore, it is not one of the specifically listed crimes 
under the residual provision—burglary, arson, extortion, or use of explo-
sives.35 
Thus, the Court was left with the narrow question of whether at-
tempted burglary fell under the ACCA’s residual provision, which in-
cludes crimes that “otherwise involve[] conduct that present[] a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.”36  In answering this question, 
the Court employed the “categorical approach.”  Under this approach, 
courts “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of 
the prior offense,” and do not consider the “particular facts disclosed by 
the record of conviction.”37  In other words, courts consider whether the 
elements of the crime present a serious potential risk of physical injury 
without looking to “the specific conduct of this particular offender.”38 
The Court held that attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, 
“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another,” and thus qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA39 be-
cause it poses the same level of risk as the completed offense of bur-
glary.40  The Court reasoned that in the burglary of a home, the potential 
for confrontation and injury arises if the homeowner discovers the bur-
glar.41  Thus, the risk of confrontation in an attempted burglary is the 
same or similar to the risk of completed burglary because confrontation 
could occur regardless of whether the crime was in fact completed.42 
Although not every attempted burglary case poses a “realistic risk 
of confrontation or injury to anyone,” ACCA’s residual provision simply 
requires a “potential risk.”43  Similarly, the Court’s categorical approach 
does not require that “every conceivable factual offense covered by a 
statute must necessarily present a serious potential risk of injury before 
                                                                                                             
but fails in the perpetration or is intercepted or prevented in the execution thereof, commits the of-
fense of criminal attempt.” Id. § 777.04(1). 
 34. James, 550 U.S. at 197. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2009). 
 37. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575 (1990)). 
 38. James, 550 U.S. at 202. 
 39. Id. at 203–04. 
 40. Id. at 203. 
 41. Id. at 201. 
 42. Id. at 211–12. 
 43. Id. at 207. 
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the offense can be deemed a violent felony.”44  Rather, the Court consid-
ers whether the conduct described by the elements of the offense, in the 
ordinary sense, presents a serious potential for physical injury to anoth-
er.45  Thus, the James decision stands for the proposition that, “[a]s long 
as an offense is of a type that, by its nature, presents a serious potential 
risk of injury to another, it satisfies the requirements of 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual provision.”46 
The Court’s reasoning in James allows courts to weigh the risk of 
the instant crime against the risk of crimes listed in the statute.  Thus, 
under the James decision, the ACCA encompasses all crimes that pose a 
serious risk of physical injury.  Recognizing that some risky crimes may 
not demonstrate that a criminal is particularly dangerous when in posses-
sion of a firearm and identifying a need for a more definite standard, the 
Court granted certiorari for Begay and changed the James standard just 
one year after it was decided. 
B.  Begay v. United States 
In September 2004, Larry Begay was arrested after he threatened 
his aunt and his sister with a rifle.47  Mr. Begay pleaded guilty to posses-
sion of a firearm after committing three prior felonies, a violation of 
§ 922(g)(1).48  Under New Mexico law, if an individual accrues four 
driving-under-the-influence (DUI) convictions, the crime becomes a fe-
lony.49  Because Mr. Begay had accrued twelve DUI convictions, he had 
committed the crime of felony DUI three times over.50  The sentencing 
judge concluded that Mr. Begay had at least three prior convictions “pu-
nishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” and that the 
prior convictions involved “conduct that presents a serious potential risk 
of physical injury to another.”51  Thus, Mr. Begay was sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum prison term of fifteen years as provided in the 
ACCA.52 
Mr. Begay appealed, arguing that DUI is not a violent felony under 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual provision because the provision embraces 
only crimes that present a serious potential risk in the same way as those 
                                                 
 44. Id. at 208. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 209. 
 47. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1583 (2008). 
 48. Id. at 1584. 
 49. Id. at 1583–84. 
 50. Id. at 1584. 
 51. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 52. Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1584. 
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listed, and DUI is too dissimilar to the listed crimes to be included.53  
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentencing decision.  Mr. 
Begay sought and was granted certiorari.54 
As an initial matter, the Court noted that because New Mexico’s 
DUI law does not include “as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” a convic-
tion under New Mexico law could not qualify as a violent felony under 
the physical force provision, § 924 (e)(2)(B)(i).  Furthermore, because 
DUI is not one of the crimes listed under § 924 (e)(2)(B)(ii), the only 
way it would qualify is if it falls within the scope of the ACCA’s residual 
provision. 
Thus, the specific question before the Court was whether convic-
tions under New Mexico’s felony DUI law qualify as violent felonies 
under the residual provision—whether it otherwise “presents a serious 
potential of physical injury to another.”55  The Court answered that ques-
tion in the negative, holding that felony drunk driving does not qualify as 
a predicate offense because it does not involve the kind of “purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive” conduct typical of the listed offenses.56 
In the Court’s view, a predicate crime should be more than poten-
tially risky.  Rather, a predicate crime should indicate that an offender, 
“later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a vic-
tim.”57  The majority reasoned that the mere existence of the provision’s 
listed examples—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use 
of explosives—demonstrate that Congress intended the statute to cover 
crimes similar to those listed but not every crime that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.58  If Congress had meant the 
statute to cover every such crime, it would not have included the exam-
ples at all.  Thus, the Court limited qualifying crimes under the residual 
provision to crimes that are “roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree 
of risk posed” to those listed in the statute.59 
To be “similar in kind” to the listed offenses, the Court held that an 
offense must be purposeful, violent, and aggressive.  According to the 
Court, if burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives are all exam-
                                                 
 53. United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 966 (10th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 
1581 (2008). 
 54. Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1584. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1587.  Four justices joined in the opinion and one justice concurred in the judgment.  
The concurring and dissenting opinions demonstrate that the Court remains divided on how to pro-
ceed in sentencing decisions under the ACCA. 
 57. Id. at 1586. 
 58. Id. at 1585. 
 59. Id. 
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ples of crimes that “otherwise involve conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another,” then DUI differs from the 
listed crimes in “at least one pertinent, and important, respect.”60  “The 
listed crimes all typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct,” while DUI typically does not.  Applying the Court’s reasoning, 
only crimes committed purposefully or intentionally61 indicate that the 
criminal is dangerous when in possession of a gun; strict liability crimes, 
on the other hand, do not. 
Thus, the Begay decision created a two-step analysis for residual 
clause interpretation.62  First, a court must determine whether a crime 
creates a serious potential for physical injury.63  If so, then the court 
proceeds to step two: determining whether the crime is purposeful, vio-
lent, and aggressive.64  As always, the court considers the crime categori-
cally, asking whether it typically involves purposeful, violent, and ag-
gressive behavior and not how an “individual offender might have com-
mitted it on a particular occasion.”65 
With only those three imprecise adjectives to guide them, district 
and circuit courts released a flurry of misguided66 and confused67 deci-
sions in the wake of Begay.  These decisions demonstrate why Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence in Begay was correct: the majority failed to “pro-
vide a complete framework that will embrace all future cases” and in-
                                                 
 60. Id. at 1586. 
 61. The Supreme Court used purposeful and intentional interchangeably.  See id. at 1587–88. 
 62. Id. at 1586.  Some courts consider this a three-step inquiry.  For example, see United States 
v. Harrsion, 558 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2009), where the court stated 
James and Begay, taken together, establish a three-step inquiry for determining whether a 
crime falls under the ACCA’s residual provision.  First, what is the relevant category of 
crime, determined by looking to how the crime is ordinarily committed?  Second, does 
that crime pose a “serious potential risk of physical injury” that is similar in degree to the 
risks posed by the enumerated crimes?  Third, is that crime similar in kind to the enume-
rated crimes? 
Id. 
 63. Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1583. 
 64. Id. at 1587. 
 65. Id. at 1584. 
 66. E.g., compare United States v. Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2009), and United States 
v. LaCasse, 567 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2009), with Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280. 
 67. Judge Edward F. Shea expressed his displeasure with the Begay decision on the record: 
[by] including the holy trinity of purposeful, violent, and aggressive, all the Supreme 
Court did was confuse the entire issue, do a grave disservice to everybody like yourself 
and the defender’s office and everyone else who’s attempting to make sense out of their 
opinions and administer justice fairly to all.  And I simply regard it as meaningless and 
not worthy of consideration. 
See Transcript of Proceedings at 15, United States v. Dustin Andrew Christensen, No. CR-04-267-
EFS (E.D. Wash. Jul. 9, 2009). 
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stead continued the Court’s tradition of a “piecemeal, suspenseful, 
Scrabble-like approach” to interpreting the residual provision.68 
The Begay Court’s choice of the terms purposeful, violent, and ag-
gressive is deeply flawed for three reasons: first, the Court’s purposeful 
mens rea requirement excludes some particularly dangerous crimes, 
crimes that should qualify under ACCA; second, the terms violent and 
aggressive are exceedingly difficult to apply, leaving courts confused and 
circuits split; and third, deciding whether crimes are typically committed 
purposefully, violently, and aggressively is needlessly complicated. 
1.  The Court’s Purposeful Mens Rea Requirement Excludes Some 
Particularly Dangerous Crimes 
In Begay, the Court sought to rectify the James standard.  The 
James standard was flawed because it qualified all risky crimes, regard-
less of whether the person who committed the crime was particularly 
dangerous when possessing a gun.  By limiting crimes to only those that 
are similar in kind to those listed in ACCA, the Begay Court sought to 
capture the essence of the ACCA.  Given the ACCA’s purpose of keep-
ing guns out of dangerous individuals’ hands, the Begay Court’s similar 
in kind distinction makes sense; a burglar is more likely to use a gun 
while burglarizing a home than a drunk driver is when driving drunk.  
When a burglar burglarizes a home, she may use a gun against the home-
owner if discovered, while a drunk driver is less likely to use a gun 
against those she encounters.  Without Begay’s distinction, criminals 
who are not necessarily dangerous when in possession of a gun would be 
subject to the stiff fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.69 
But the Court’s solution—qualifying crimes only if they are typi-
cally committed purposefully, violently, and aggressively—utterly fails 
to capture the essence of this distinction.70  Rather, this new standard al-
lows crimes to be shoehorned into the purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
mold or, alternatively, excluded by it. 
Mr. Franetich’s case embodies this principle.  Before Begay, Mr. 
Franetich would have been an armed career criminal under the ACCA; 
                                                 
 68. Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1589 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In Scalia’s opinion, the Court simply 
adopted a standard that would remove felony drunk driving from the purview of the residual provi-
sion, without any basis for holding that the crimes must be similar in kind as well as degree of risk 
and without considering the implications of this decision on future cases.  Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Both Mr. Begay and Mr. Franetich are exactly the types of individuals who would delibe-
rately point a gun and pull the trigger.  After all, Mr. Begay threatened his aunt and sister with a 
rifle, id. at 1583, and Mr. Franetich shot a gun out of a moving vehicle, Order Granting Def.’s Mot. 
to Reconsider Armed Career Criminal Designation, supra note 1, at 4.  But neither of them had 
committed a crime that would qualify for ACCA status. 
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he had committed three violent felonies by the time he was found in pos-
session of a firearm.71  After Begay, however, he was not; Mr. Franetich 
lacked the three violent felonies because a third-degree assault convic-
tion no longer qualified.72  At sentencing, however, the district court ad-
dressed a new question: whether Mr. Franetich’s drive-by shooting con-
viction qualified as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guide-
lines.73  Even though Mr. Franetich no longer qualified for ACCA en-
hancement, this question was still relevant because the Begay decision 
also changed the way courts view the Sentencing Guidelines.74  In short, 
if drive-by shooting was a crime of violence, then Mr. Franetich faced a 
higher base offense level and, ultimately, a higher sentence.75 
The very phrase the Begay Court chose to more accurately embody 
the ACCA’s purpose failed in practice because it excluded the quintes-
sential ACCA crime: drive-by shooting.  Under Washington law, “[a] 
person is guilty of drive-by shooting when he or she recklessly dis-
charges a firearm . . . in a manner which creates a substantial risk of 
death or serious physical injury to another person.”76  Drive-by shooting 
does not qualify as a violent felony under the physical force provision 
because physical force is not an element of drive-by shooting.77  Similar-
ly, drive-by shooting is not one of the listed crimes in the residual provi-
sion.  Consequently, drive-by shooting would qualify only if it otherwise 
involved conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another78 under the residual provision. 
Pre-Begay, drive-by shooting would qualify.  Discharging a firearm 
in a manner that creates substantial risk of death or serious physical in-
jury to another person79 surely presents a serious potential risk of physi-
                                                 
 71. Order Granting Def.’s Mot. to Reconsider Armed Career Criminal Designation, supra note 
1, at 2.  Mr. Franetich’s third-degree assault, drive-by shooting, and riot convictions qualified him 
for ACCA’s fifteen-year sentence.  Id. 
 72. Id. at 4.  “[T]he result is that Defendant lacks the three (3) prior violent felonies necessary 
for an ACCA sentence.”  Id. 
 73. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Jeriehmie Joel Franetich, No. CR-
06-123-EFS (E.D. Wash. Aug. 20, 2008), aff’d mem., 344 Fed. Appx. 416 (9th Cir. 2009) [hereinaf-
ter Franetich Sentencing].  Because Mr. Franetich admitted to committing riot while armed with a 
dangerous weapon, the court found that this was a purposeful, violent, and aggressive act that quali-
fied as a crime of violence. Jeriehmie J. Franetich, 344 Fed. Appx. at 417–19 (mem.). 
 74. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26. 
 75. Franetich Sentencing, supra note 73, at 10. 
 76. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.045(1) (2009) (emphasis added).  Drive-by shooting is a Class 
B felony in Washington, id. § 9A.36.045(3), making it punishable by more than one year of incarce-
ration. 
 77. See United States v. Howell, 531 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. July 7, 2008) (finding that reckless 
cause of physical injury does not indicate an element of physical force). 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2009). 
 79. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.045(1) (2009) 
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cal injury of another.80  But post-Begay, the Supreme Court required a 
purposeful mental state to qualify as a predicate offense under the 
ACCA.  Thus, because drive-by shooting requires recklessness, not pur-
posefulness, it is no longer a crime of violence; it is not purposeful, vio-
lent, and aggressive.81 
Because drive-by shooting was not a crime of violence, Mr. Frane-
tich’s USSG base offense level was lowered from 24 to 20.82  Although 
this also lowered Mr. Franetich’s recommended Sentencing Guidelines 
range to 63–78 months, Judge Edward F. Shea was authorized to impose 
a maximum sentence of 120 months under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).83  At 
sentencing, Judge Shea departed from the recommended range, sentenc-
ing Mr. Franetich to 102 months and expressing his displeasure with the 
Begay decision: 
[I]n my mind, you’re exactly the kind of person that Justice Breyer 
was taking about.  You have all the likelihoods—likelihood of hav-
ing a gun and hurting people.  You’ve thrown a beer can, a full beer 
can, in the face of a loved one.  You’ve stabbed another loved one 
twice. . . .  But for the benefit of some very surreptitious decisions 
by the United States Supreme Court, you would have been an 
Armed Career Criminal, and I would have sentenced you to 15 
years, but you’ve had – you’ve had good luck in that regard.  The 
United States Supreme Court in its wisdom has seen fit to define 
things in a way that’s been beneficial to you.  So you’ve saved 
yourself from what was almost a certain sentence of 15 years in my 
mind and much deserved, because you are in my mind, as a practic-
al matter, an Armed Career Criminal, to a guideline range now of 
top end 78 months with a statutory max of 120.84 
Surely a man who recklessly discharges a firearm out the window of a 
moving vehicle is the type of person who should be prosecuted under the 
Act.  Gun crimes are inherently risky.  Crimes involving guns are indica-
tive of the very individuals Congress aimed to protect society from—
those who are dangerous when in possession of a gun.  Mr. Franetich is 
exactly that type of man: he has committed third-degree assault, drive-by 
                                                 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 81. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (2008). 
 82. Franetich Sentencing, supra note 73, at 10, 18. 
 83. Because Mr. Franetich’s riot conviction qualified under ACCA, while his third-degree 
assault and drive-by shooting convictions did not, his resulting total offense level was calculated as 
nineteen: twenty for one previous violent felony, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2009), plus two because the firearm has an obliterated serial number, id. 
§ 2K2.1(b)(4), and minus three for acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1.  Neither party objected 
to the conclusion that Mr. Franetich had twenty-five criminal history points, a total offense level of 
VI.  Accordingly, the applicable guideline range was 63–78 months.  Id. at 18. 
 84. Franetich Sentencing, supra note 73, at 35–38. 
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shooting, and riot.85  Nonetheless, the Begay decision unambiguously 
excludes a number of crimes from the scope of the residual provision, 
including drive-by shooting. 
2.  The Terms “Violent” and “Aggressive” Are Exceedingly Difficult to 
Apply, Leaving Courts Confused and Circuits Split 
Purposeful is a distinct legal term; it is easy to define and to apply 
to a set of facts.  But because the terms violent and aggressive are not 
legal terms, and the Begay Court did not define them,86 deciding whether 
a crime is violent and aggressive proves difficult.  Lower courts have 
dealt with this problem by asking whether the elements of the crime fall 
within common definitions,87 which results in conflicting interpretations 
of violent and aggressive.  Two examples demonstrate this principle. 
First, circuits are split on whether the crime of felony fleeing arrest 
(or eluding a police officer) qualifies as a violent felony under the Act.88  
In United States v. Harrimon,89 the Fifth Circuit held that fleeing arrest 
satisfies the Begay test; it both presents a serious potential risk for physi-
cal injury to police officers and bystanders and involves purposeful, vio-
lent, and aggressive behavior.90  This is because an offender’s use of a 
vehicle to evade police necessarily involves force against other motorists 
and pedestrians and typically leads to confrontation with officers.91  On 
the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit found, in United States v. Harri-
                                                 
 85. Order Granting Def.’s Mot. to Reconsider Armed Career Criminal Designation, supra note 
1, at 4. 
 86. The Court did, however, explain why a DUI is not violent and aggressive.  See Begay, 127 
S. Ct. at 1586–87. 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2008).  In Herrick, the court de-
fined violence as “marked by extreme force and sudden intense activity.”  Id. at 58 (citing Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 24 (11th ed. 2003)).  It defined aggressive as “tending toward or 
exhibiting aggression,” in “a forceful action or procedure (as an unprovoked attack) esp. when in-
tended to dominate or master.”  Id.  Applying these definitions, the First Circuit found that Wiscon-
sin’s vehicular homicide felony was not a crime of violence.  Id.  Although it was violent, it was not 
aggressive because the statute requires criminal negligence, while the definition of aggressive in-
volves a degree of intent when engaging in a forceful action.  Id. at 59.  The Wisconsin statute, en-
titled “Homicide by negligent operation of vehicle,” under which Herrick was convicted, provides as 
follows: “(1) Whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or han-
dling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony; and (2) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child 
by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony.”  WIS. STAT. § 
940.10 (2005). 
 88. Compare United States v. Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2009), and United States v. 
LaCasse, 567 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2009), with United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
 89. 568 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 90. Id. at 534–36. 
 91. Id. at 535. 
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son,92 that the crime of “willful fleeing after a police vehicle had acti-
vated its lights and sirens” failed the Begay two-step because it did not 
present the same high-level risk as those listed offenses and, although 
purposeful, it was not sufficiently violent and aggressive to be similar in 
kind to the listed offenses.93 
Second, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Zuniga94 
contradicts, at least in part, the Supreme Court’s Chambers decision.95  
In Zuniga, the Tenth Circuit found that Mr. Zuniga’s knowing possession 
of a weapon in prison, like burglary, “indicates a readiness to enter into 
conflict,” creating the likelihood of violent confrontation.96  Thus, ac-
cording to the Tenth Circuit, the crime of knowing possession of a wea-
pon in prison “typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct.”97 But in Chambers, the Supreme Court rejected98 the govern-
ment’s argument that Mr. Chambers’ failure to report to prison is pur-
poseful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary, even 
though that crime indicates a readiness to enter into conflict.99  Instead, 
the Court concluded that “[c]onceptually speaking, the crime amounts to 
a form of inaction, a far cry from the ‘purposeful,’ ‘violent’ and ‘aggres-
sive’ conduct’ contemplated by Begay.”100 
This inconsistency may be resolved, and the cases reconciled, if 
courts were able to consider the purpose of the ACCA.  Generally speak-
ing, a person who actually holds a weapon in prison is the type of person 
who is particularly dangerous when in possession of a gun, while a per-
son who simply fails to report to prison is not.  But these cases cannot be 
reconciled under Begay because courts cannot consider ACCA’s pur-
pose.101  Instead, a court must fit the particular elements of a crime into a 
trio of adjectives that the Supreme Court believes to embody ACCA’s 
purpose.102  Whether those adjectives actually embody that purpose is in 
serious doubt. 
                                                 
 92. 558 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 93. Id. at 1293–96. 
 94. 553 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 95. 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009); for discussion, see Part III.C. 
 96. Zuniga, 553 F.3d at 1336. 
 97. Id. at 1334. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692–93. 
 100. Id. at 692. 
 101. See generally Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1583 (2008). 
 102. Perhaps this is because the Zuniga court did not have the opportunity to apply Chambers, 
given that the decision was made only three days after Chambers. 
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3.  Determining Whether Crimes Are Typically Committed Purposefully, 
Violently, and Aggressively is Needlessly Complicated 
In Begay, the Court held that an ACCA crime must typically in-
volve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.103  But are the listed 
offenses themselves typically committed purposefully, violently, and ag-
gressively?  In James, the Court posed the imaginary situation of an ex-
tortion scheme in which an anonymous blackmailer threatens to release 
embarrassing personal information about the victim unless he is mailed 
regular payments.104  In this situation, the risk of physical injury to 
another is minimal, and although purposeful, the extortion is not commit-
ted violently or aggressively.  But a court is not concerned with how an 
extortionist behaved in one particular instance; it must determine wheth-
er extortion is typically committed violently or aggressively. 
In Begay, the Court defined extortion under the Model Penal Code 
as “‘purposely’ obtaining property of another through threat of, e.g., in-
flicting ‘bodily injury.’”105  But this definition is incomplete.  In fact, the 
Model Penal Code defines extortion as obtaining property of another by 
threatening to: 
(1) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other criminal of-
fense; or 
(2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or 
(3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute; or 
(4) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take 
or withhold action; or 
(5) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective un-
official action, if the property is not demanded or received for the 
benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or 
(6) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or informa-
tion with respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or 
(7) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.106 
Subsections (2)–(7) are committed without any trace of violence or ag-
gression.  Thus, it is possible that extortion is not typically committed 
                                                 
 103. Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1586. 
 104. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208–09 (2007). 
 105. Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1586. 
 106. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (2001). 
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purposefully, violently, and aggressively, but rather through other non-
violent means.107 
Furthermore, how is a court to tell whether a crime is typically 
committed purposefully, violently, and aggressively in a case where a 
statute may criminalize purposeful and non-purposeful, violent and non-
violent, and aggressive and non-aggressive behavior?  In the general 
sense, nonconsensual sex crimes are considered purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive, while consensual ones are not.108  This makes sense because 
a person who forcibly engages in sexual relations with another is the type 
of dangerous individual who is more likely to deliberately point a gun 
and pull the trigger.  The Washington statute at issue in United States v. 
Christensen, however, criminalizes both consensual and nonconsensual 
sex with a minor: 
A person is guilty of rape of a child in the third degree when the 
person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least fourteen 
years old but less than sixteen years old and not married to the per-
petrator and the perpetrator is at least forty-eight months older than 
the victim.109 
“Consent by the victim is not a defense” to a charge of statutory rape 
under RCW 9A.44.079.110   
In Christensen, the Ninth Circuit held that under the categorical ap-
proach, Christensen’s conviction for statutory rape in violation of Wash-
ington law does not constitute a violent felony under ACCA.  The court 
stated that “because statutory rape may involve consensual sexual inter-
course, it does not necessarily involve either ‘violent’ or ‘aggressive’ 
conduct and, therefore, is not a violent crime under the ACCA.”111  The 
Christensen court stated “[b]ecause the Court in Begay used the conjunc-
tion ‘and,’ all three of its criteria⎯‘purposeful, violent, and aggres-
                                                 
 107. Similarly, in his Begay concurrence, Justice Scalia points out that one of the listed 
crimes—the unlawful use of explosives—may involve negligent or reckless conduct.  Begay, 128 S. 
Ct. at 1590.  Under the Model Penal Code, “[a] person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he recklessly 
creates a risk of catastrophe in the employment of fire, explosives or other dangerous means.”  
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2(2) (2001). 
 108. Compare United States v. Rooks, 556 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding nonconsensual 
sexual assault was a crime of violence because it is purposeful, violent, and aggressive as it “endan-
gers the health and life of the victim” and creates a risk of confrontation), with United States v. 
Thornton, 554 F.3d 443 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that consensual statutory rape is not a crime of 
violence because it does not, by its definition, involve the use of force, and thus is not violent and 
aggressive). 
 109. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.079(1). 
 110. State v. Heming, 90 P.3d 62, 63 (Wash. App. 2004). 
 111. United States v. Christensen, 559 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Heming, 90 P.3d 
at 63). 
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sive’⎯must be satisfied.”112  However, the Christensen court failed to 
mention the word typically.  How is one able to tell whether statutory 
rape is typically committed with consent or without?  The Begay decision 
leaves this question unanswered. 
C.  United States v. Chambers 
Decided just one year after Begay, Chambers113 is the latest in the 
line of Supreme Court residual provision cases.114  Deondery Chambers 
pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g).  
At sentencing, the government sought a fifteen-year mandatory prison 
sentence under the ACCA.115  While Mr. Chambers conceded that his 
1998 conviction for robbery and aggravated battery and his 1999 drug-
crime convictions fell within the ACCA’s definitions, he argued that his 
failure to report for penal confinement conviction did not.116  Mr. Cham-
bers’ 1998 sentence required him to report for weekend confinement ele-
ven times, four of which he failed to appear.117  He was later convicted of 
the crime of failing to report to a penal institution under Illinois law.118 
Under the categorical approach, courts must consider whether the 
generic set of acts, not the specific act committed on the particular occa-
sion, falls under the residual provision by presenting a serious potential 
risk of physical injury.119  The Illinois statute at issue criminalized sever-
al different kinds of behavior: (1) escape from a penal institution, (2) es-
cape from the custody of a penal institution employee, (3) failure to re-
port to a penal institution, (4) failure to report for periodic imprisonment, 
(5) failure to return from furlough, (6) failure to return from work and 
day release, and (7) failure to abide by terms of home confinement.120  
Mr. Chambers pleaded guilty to the lesser crime of knowingly failing to 
                                                 
 112. Christensen, 559 F.3d at 1095. 
 113. 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009).  In Chambers, the Court does not indicate any intention of chang-
ing the Begay standard. 
 114. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).  The Johnson opinion, decided on 
March 2, 2010, as this article goes to press, is restricted to interpretation of the physical force provi-
sion.  See id. at 1265 (denying remand for reconsideration under the residual clause—“the Govern-
ment did not keep this option alive because it disclaimed at sentencing any reliance upon the residual 
clause”).  The Johnson decision does not so much as mention Begay.  See id. 
 115. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 690. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990); see also Shepard v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 13, 16–17 (2005). 
 120. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (2009). 
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report for periodic imprisonment to Jefferson County Jail—a penal insti-
tution.121 
The district court treated the failure to report as an “escape from [a] 
penal institution” and thus held that it qualified as a violent felony under 
the ACCA.122  The Seventh Circuit reluctantly agreed.123  Recognizing a 
circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.124  Unlike the lower 
courts, the Supreme Court separated “failure to report” from “escape 
from a penal institution” under the Illinois statute, “treat[ing] the statute 
for ACCA purposes as containing at least two separate crimes, namely, 
escape from custody on the one hand, and a failure to report on the oth-
er.”125  The Court found that when a statute, like this one, criminalizes 
purposeful and non-purposeful, violent and non-violent, and aggressive 
and non-aggressive behavior, courts must “choose the right category.”126  
The “nature of the behavior that underlies the statutory phrase” matters 
in this determination.127  Because Mr. Chambers pleaded guilty to the 
lesser crime of knowingly failing to report for periodic imprisonment, 
failure to report was the crime at issue.128 
Thus, the question before the Court was whether failure to report 
for penal confinement as defined under Illinois law was a violent felony 
within ACCA’s residual provision.129  The Court found that although it is 
a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,”130 
it did not satisfy either of § 924(e)(2)(B)’s sub-clauses.  It does not quali-
fy under the physical force provision because it does not have as an ele-
ment the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person of another,131 and it is not one of the listed crimes of burglary, 
arson, extortion, or the use of explosives.132  Finally, it does not qualify 
under the residual provision because it does not involve conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.133 
                                                 
 121. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691. 
 122. Id. at 690. 
 123. Id.; United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 124. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 690; compare United States v. Winn, 364 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 
2004) (failure to report is a violent felony), with United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (failure to report is not a violent felony). 
 125. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691. 
 126. Id. at 690. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 691. 
 129. Id. at 690. 
 130. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2009). 
 131. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 
 132. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 133. Id. 
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The government argued that failure to report escape revealed an of-
fender’s strong aversion to penal custody and that it is dangerous in the 
same way as a burglary.  Because common-law burglary is committed 
once one enters a structure with the requisite intent, the risk of injury 
arises in the act of discovery or in the instance of confrontation.134  Simi-
larly, in knowingly failing to report to a penal institution, the risk arises 
once the crime has been committed and law enforcement has been dis-
patched.135  An individual, like Mr. Chambers, deliberately commits the 
crime while conscious of the risk of a closely-related, violent confronta-
tion.  Thus, the crime is similar to the listed offenses of burglary, arson, 
extortion, and use of explosives.136 
The Court was not convinced.  The Court noted that, 
“[c]onceptually speaking, the crime amounts to a form of inaction, a far 
cry from the ‘purposeful,’ ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct contem-
plated by Begay.”137  Furthermore, relying on statistical data developed 
by the Sentencing Commission,138 the Chambers Court found that an of-
fender is not “significantly more likely than others to attack or physically 
resist an apprehender, thereby producing a serious potential risk of phys-
ical injury.”139  The data “strongly supports the intuitive belief that fail-
ure to report does not involve a serious potential risk of physical in-
jury.”140  In sum, the Chambers Court found that failure to report does 
not qualify as a violent felony because it is a crime of inaction—it is not 
the sort of purposeful, violent, and aggressive behavior that would rise to 
the level of risk in burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives.141 
IV.  PROPOSALS 
In place of Begay’s purposeful, violent, and aggressive standard, 
the Supreme Court or Congress could take one of several approaches to 
remedy ACCA’s ailing residual provision.  The most practical, fair, and 
consistent approach would be for Congress to amend the statute to pro-
vide two lists: a list of crimes that qualify as violent felonies and a list of 
crimes that do not.  The Sentencing Guidelines have successfully used 
this approach for years, making it an excellent model for the residual 
provision. 
                                                 
 134. Brief for the United States at 18, Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009) (No. 
06-11206), 2008 WL 4598678. 
 135. Id. at 18–20. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692. 
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A.  Possible Supreme Court Actions 
1.  Status Quo 
The Court could keep the Begay standard, and wait to review cases 
in which courts have applied the purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
standard illogically.  For example, in Chambers, the Court accepted cer-
tiorari less than a year after releasing the Begay decision.142  In that case, 
the crime of failure to report was arguably purposeful, violent, and ag-
gressive in the same way as burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explo-
sives.143  However, because failure to report was a crime of inaction, it 
was simply not the kind of crime contemplated by the ACCA,144 despite 
the fact that the Court could have shoehorned the crime into the Begay 
mold.  This approach would not, however, solve the problems discussed 
in Part III.B(1)–(3) of this Comment. 
2.  Readopt the James Standard 
The Supreme Court could readopt the James standard, which re-
quires courts to determine whether a crime presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury regardless of intent.145  While this alternative 
would allow courts to make individualized decisions free from the pur-
poseful, violent, and aggressive straightjacket, it fails to capture the true 
essence of the ACCA.  The ACCA’s purpose is to incapacitate individu-
als who are particularly dangerous when in possession of a gun.146  Un-
like felonies such as operating a dump truck without the consent of the 
owner,147 negligent pollution,148 and reckless tampering with consumer 
products,149 felonies under the ACCA should indicate a higher level of 
dangerousness. 
The majority in Begay attempted to limit the ACCA qualification to 
crimes that are similar to those that Congress listed in the statute.  In the 
Court’s opinion, what distinguishes crimes under the ACCA from regular 
crimes is that crimes under the ACCA are committed purposefully, vio-
lently, and aggressively.  Flawed as it is, the Begay decision attempts to 
link the scope of the ACCA with its purpose.  Mere risk-balancing, re-
                                                 
 142. Chambers v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 687 (2008) (mem.). 
 143. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 207 (2007). 
 146. See supra text accompanying notes 11–12. 
 147. See United States v. Johnson, 417 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 148. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2009). 
 149. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2009). 
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gardless of the person committing the crime, does not create that essen-
tial link; thus, re-adoption of the James standard is not the best option. 
3.  A Flexible, Purpose-Driven Standard 
The Supreme Court could abandon the Begay framework and re-
place it with a more flexible, purpose-driven standard.  Under this new 
standard, a court would first consider whether the crime otherwise 
creates a serious potential risk of physical injury, which is consistent 
with the James analysis and the first step of the Begay analysis.  Once 
the potential for physical injury is established, a court would consider the 
crime in conjunction with the ACCA’s purpose.  Instead of asking 
whether the crime falls within Begay’s rigid purposeful, violent, and ag-
gressive standard, a court would simply ask whether the crime is indica-
tive of the type of individual targeted by the ACCA⎯an individual who 
is particularly dangerous when possessing a gun. 
While this purpose-driven standard gets to the heart of the ACCA’s 
purpose, it may be more elusive than the Begay approach.  Allowing 
courts to consider crimes on a case-by-case basis will undoubtedly lead 
to inconsistent results, falling short of being “concrete enough to ensure 
that the ACCA residual provision will be applied with an acceptable de-
gree of consistency by the hundreds of district judges that impose sen-
tences every day.”150  While this approach would give courts much-
needed flexibility, courts would also have the “power to subject almost 
any repeat offender to the ACCA’s fifteen-year mandatory minimum.”151  
Conversely, courts could allow dangerous criminals to assimilate back 
into society without a well-deserved fifteen-year prison term.  True, a 
purpose-driven standard would uphold the purpose of the statute the best.  
But if the goal is consistency, this proposal fails. 
4.  Scalia’s Standard 
The Court could adopt Justice Scalia’s proposal, which is set out in 
his concurring opinions in both James and Begay.  Justice Scalia, while 
agreeing with Begay’s result, generally opposed the Court’s purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive standard because the statutory language does not 
warrant it.152 
For Justice Scalia, the ACCA’s congressional intent is best served 
when all crimes that present a serious potential risk of physical injury are 
included within the scope of the residual provision.153  Thus, the best way 
                                                 
 150. James, 550 U.S. at 215  (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. at 224. 
 152. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1589 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 153. Id. 
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to interpret § 924(e) is to first determine which of the listed crimes poses 
the least serious risk of physical injury.154  That level will be set as the 
serious potential risk required by the statute.  Crimes that pose at least 
that serious a risk of injury are encompassed by the statute, while those 
that do not rise to the level of serious potential risk are excluded.155 
This standard, although “seemingly straightforward,”156 requires 
courts to engage in simple risk-balancing without considering the type of 
offender that commits the crime. But Begay made clear that the ACCA 
requires more than just risk-balancing.  Crimes that qualify should indi-
cate that a criminal is “the kind of person who might deliberately point 
the gun and pull the trigger.”157  Because Justice Scalia’s proposal in-
cludes all crimes that present a potential risk of physical injury, no mat-
ter how benign, this standard is not the best option. 
5.  Hold it Void for Vagueness 
Finally, the Court could acknowledge the statute as constitutionally 
unintelligible and hold it void for vagueness.158  As Justice Scalia argues, 
“Congress has simply abdicated its responsibility when it passes a crimi-
nal statute insusceptible of an interpretation that enables principled, pre-
dictable application; and this Court has abdicated its responsibility when 
it allows that.”159  Thus, the Court could simply void the statute and ask 
Congress to render a new, more definite statute that provides more guid-
ance. 
B.  Possible Congressional Actions 
Congress could take one of two approaches to remedy the ACCA’s 
ailing residual provision.  First, Congress could amend the ACCA to 
create a specific list of crimes worthy of ACCA enhancement.  Second, 
Congress could abandon the ACCA altogether, recognizing that Supreme 
Court standards are inconsistent and unfair given the ACCA’s fifteen-
year mandatory minimum.  While neither approach is ideal, if the goal is 
practicality, the former is the surest bet.  But if the goal is absolute fair-
ness, the latter prevails. 
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 158. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007)  (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
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1.  Amend the ACCA, Using the Sentencing Guidelines as a Model 
In his concurring opinion in Chambers, Justice Alito advocates for 
a list of qualifying crimes, describing this approach as “the only way to 
right ACCA’s ship.”160  Congressional intent would no longer be a mys-
tery because Congress would list each crime that it believes should quali-
fy under the ACCA.  But criminal codes vary widely because states 
name and define crimes differently.  This variation makes an exhaustive 
list encompassing all fifty states’ codes impracticable, if not impossible. 
The Sentencing Guidelines, however, has used the list approach for 
several years,161 making it an excellent model for how to amend the 
ACCA.  USSG § 4A1.2(c)(1) is particularly helpful because it describes 
how to count criminal history points for sentencing purposes, a computa-
tion that is similar to the way that ACCA counts predicate crimes.162  
Section 4A1.2(c)(1) first identifies sentences that are counted, followed 
by a list of generic crimes.  It states, “[s]entences for the following prior 
offenses and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known 
are counted.”163  Then, the Sentencing Guidelines identify offenses or 
ones similar to those, by whatever name they are known, which are never 
counted.164 
To help courts understand how to apply this section, the Sentencing 
Guidelines provide useful commentary, outlining relevant factors for 
courts to consider when determining whether an unlisted offense is simi-
lar to an offense listed under that section.  Courts are directed to use 
common sense to compare the punishment, seriousness, elements, culpa-
bility, and likelihood of recurring criminal conduct between a listed and 
unlisted crime.165  When common sense is used to determine whether a 
state crime is similar to a listed generic crime, the analysis becomes sim-
ple. 
To illustrate, consider Virginia’s statutory rape provision, which 
classifies nonforcible carnal knowledge of a minor.166  Given only its 
                                                 
 160. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009). 
 161. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(c)(1) (2009). 
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 166. See United States v. Thornton, 554 F.3d 443, 448 (4th Cir. 2009).  Under Virginia law, a 
person is guilty of statutory rape if he “carnally knows, without the use of force, a child thirteen 
years of age or older but under fifteen years of age.” VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63(A) (West 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
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name, deciding what type of criminal behavior this crime covers is not 
straightforward.  But considering that carnal knowledge is essentially 
sexual contact,167 common sense dictates that this crime is commonly 
known as statutory rape.  Assuming Congress includes statutory rape in 
its list of ACCA crimes, Virginia’s non-forcible carnal knowledge of a 
minor statute would qualify because it is similar to the generic crime of 
statutory rape.  It is that simple. 
Admittedly, this solution is not perfect.  Because each state fashions 
its own criminal code, deciding whether a particular state crime is similar 
enough to a listed crime may be difficult.  Moreover, Congress could 
easily overlook a crime that should qualify, or alternatively, include a 
crime that it should not.  But the Sentencing Guidelines’ model is cur-
rently the most practical approach, providing clear direction to lower 
courts and consistent results for armed career criminals. 
2.  Abolish the Act 
On the other hand, Congress could abolish the ACCA.  As long as 
the Begay standard exists, the ACCA will be imposed inconsistently and, 
undoubtedly, on an undeserving criminal.168  Such inconsistent applica-
tion of the Begay standard creates a serious societal problem in light of 
the harsh fifteen-year sentence the statute triggers.  In doing away with 
the ACCA entirely, courts would simply sentence criminals according to 
the Sentencing Guidelines and judges could still exercise discretion to 
sentence above the Sentencing Guidelines if a particular criminal is so 
dangerous that a harsher penalty is appropriate.  True, this option would 
neither fully address Congress’s concerns about the recidivism rate of 
dangerous individuals, nor serve as the strict deterrent Congress intended 
when it drafted the ACCA.  But abandoning the ACCA would avoid the 
inconsistency plaguing the lower courts and finally allow for fairness in 
sentencing under the ACCA. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
When drafting the residual provision, Congress intended to provide 
courts with the flexibility to include (or exclude) a crime from ACCA 
status if it met (or failed to meet) the ACCA’s purpose.  In Begay, the 
Supreme Court attempted to capture that purpose by limiting felonies 
under the ACCA to those committed purposefully, violently, and aggres-
sively.  But, like other Supreme Court ACCA standards, that attempt was 
                                                 
 167. The statute defines carnal knowledge as including “the acts of sexual intercourse, cunni-
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fruitless.  The lower court decisions were plagued with frustration and 
inconsistency, and as Justice Scalia aptly described it, the Begay decision 
was a “made-for-the-case improvisation” that failed to “provide a com-
plete framework that will embrace future cases.”169 
To remedy the ACCA’s ailing residual provision, Congress should 
amend the statute, using the Sentencing Guidelines as a model.  Under 
that model, instead of wrestling a crime’s elements into Begay’s purpose-
ful, violent, and aggressive standard, a court would simply look at 
whether that crime, or a crime similar to it, is listed under the statute.  
This simple approach can finally provide clear guidance for lower courts 
and fair, consistent results for armed career criminals. 
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